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When voters fear that politicians may have a right-wing bias or that they may be in￿ uenced or
corrupted by the rich elite, signals of true left-wing conviction are valuable. As a consequence, even a
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that he is not from the right (while truly right-wing politicians also signal by choosing moderate or even
left-of-center policies). This leftist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in o¢ ce is higher
for the politician; when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter
and right-wing politicians; and when politicians are indeed likely to have a hidden right-wing agenda.
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1 Introduction
There has recently been a resurgence of ￿ populist￿politicians in many developing countries, par-
ticularly in Latin America. Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the Kirchners in Argentina, Evo Morales
in Bolivia, Alan Garcia in Peru, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador are some of the examples. The
label ￿ populist￿is often used to emphasize that these politicians use the rhetoric of aggressively
defending the interests of the ￿ common man￿against the privileged elite. Hawkins (2003), for
example, describes the rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in these terms, and writes:
￿If we de￿ne populism in strictly political terms￿ as the presence of what some
scholars call a charismatic mode of linkage between voters and politicians, and a
democratic discourse that relies on the idea of a popular will and a struggle between
￿ the people￿and ￿ the elite￿ ￿ then Chavismo is clearly a populist phenomenon.￿
Given the high levels of inequality in many of these societies, political platforms built on
redistribution are not surprising. But populist rhetoric and policies frequently appear to be to
the left of the median voter, and such policies arguably often harm rather than help the majority
of the population. In the context of macroeconomic policy, Rudiger Dornbush and Sebastian
Edwards (1991) emphasized this ￿ left of the median￿aspect of populism and wrote:
￿Populist regimes have historically tried to deal with income inequality problems
through the use of overly expansive macroeconomic policies. These policies, which
have relied on de￿cit ￿nancing, generalized controls, and a disregard for basic eco-
nomic equilibria, have almost unavoidably resulted in major macroeconomic crises
that have ended up hurting the poorer segments of society.￿
In this paper, we o⁄er a simple model of ￿ populism￿de￿ned, following Dornbusch and Ed-
wards (1991), as the implementation of policies receiving support from a signi￿cant fraction of
the population, but ultimately hurting the economic interests of this majority.1 More formally,
populist policies will be those that are to the left of the political bliss point of the median voter
but still receive support from the median voter. The key challenge is therefore to understand
why politicians adopt such policies and receive electoral support after doing so. Our starting
point is that, as the above examples suggest, the economies in question feature high levels of
inequality and su¢ ciently weak political institutions which enable the rich elites to have a dis-
proportionate in￿ uence on politics relative to their numbers. In fact, in many of these societies
1Note that this is di⁄erent from the related but distinct de￿nition of populism originating from the People￿ s
Party in the 19th century United States.
1Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1703342
political corruption and ￿ political betrayal,￿where politicians using redistributive rhetoric end
up choosing policies in line with the interests of the rich elite, are quite common (examples
would include the rule of the PRI in Mexico, the policies of traditional parties in Venezuela and
Ecuador, Fujimori￿ s reign in Peru and Menem in Argentina). This implies that voters often
distrust politicians and believe that they may adopt a rhetoric of redistribution, of leveling the
playing ￿eld and of defending the interests of the ￿ common man￿ , but then will pursue policies
in the interests of the rich elite. This makes it valuable for politicians to signal to voters that
they do not secretly have a ￿ right-wing agenda￿and are not ￿ in the pockets￿of the rich elite.
Formally, an incumbent politician chooses a policy x on the real line, and obtains utility both
from remaining in o¢ ce and also from the distance between the policy and his ￿ political bliss
point￿or ideal point (e.g., Wittman, 1973, Calvert, 1985, Besley and Coate, 1997, Osborne and
Slivinski, 1996). An incumbent politician can be of two types: (1) left-center (moderate), and
(2) right-wing. Alternatively, we also consider a version where the two types are: (1) honest,
and (2) dishonest, and dishonest politicians can be bribed by the rich elite.2 We normalize the
political bliss point of the median voter to 0, and assume that this is also the bliss point of
the moderate politician.3 The bliss point of the right-wing politician is some r > 0 (i.e., to
the right of the median voter￿ s bliss point). Voters observe a noisy signal s of the policy x of
the incumbent, and decide whether to reelect him for a second term or replace him by a new
politician. Re￿ ecting our discussion in the previous paragraph, the median voter￿ s main concern
is that the politician may in truth be a right-winger and will implement a right-wing policy in
his second term (or that he is dishonest and will be corrupted by the rich elite).
Our main result is that in order to signal that he is not right-wing, moderate politicians will
choose ￿ populist￿policies to the left of the median voter￿ s bliss point, i.e., x < 0. Moreover, a
truly right-wing politician will also choose a policy to the left of his bliss point, i.e., x < r, and
may even choose a policy to the left of the median (i.e., x < 0) when the value of political o¢ ce is
su¢ ciently high. It is interesting that what produces the left-wing bias in politics is precisely the
strength of right-wing groups (in that either the incumbent politician may be secretly aligned
with these groups or they can bribe and in￿ uence him). Because of their fear of reelecting a
politician who is in truth a right-winger, voters support politicians choosing policies to the left of
their preferences, which can loosely be interpreted as policies that are not in their ￿ best interest￿
as in our de￿nition of populism.
2Although this alternative might be a better representation of the fears of many voters in democracies with
weak institutions, we start with our baseline model because it illustrates the main ideas in a more transparent
manner.
3Our results do not require the preferences of the moderate politician to coincide with those of the median
voter; it is su¢ cient for them to be closer to those of the median voter than are the preferences of the right-wing
politician.
2In addition to providing a novel explanation for the emergence of populist policies and
leaders, our model is tractable and leads to a range of intuitive comparative static results. First,
policies are more likely to be populist (or will have greater left-wing bias) when the value of
reelection to politicians is greater, since in this case both moderate and right-wing politicians
will try to signal to voters by choosing more left-wing policies. Second, populist policies are also
more likely when the probability that the politician is indeed a right-winger is higher. Third,
they are also more likely when the probability that a politician can be corrupted is greater.
Finally, we also show, under an additional but reasonable assumption, that populist policies are
also more likely when there is greater ￿ polarization￿in society, meaning a bigger gap between the
political bliss points of the median voter and the moderate politician on the one hand and that
of the right-wing politician on the other. This is because, with greater polarization, the bene￿t
from reelection to both types of politicians is greater, encouraging more populist policies in the
￿rst period. However, counteracting this e⁄ect is that greater polarization also makes it more
costly for right-wing politicians to adopt populist policies. Our additional assumption ensures
that this second e⁄ect is dominated.
Interestingly, in the version of the model with corruption, we ￿nd that the rich elite can
be worse o⁄ precisely because of its ability to bribe politicians. In particular, the anticipation
of such bribes to dishonest politicians changes the political equilibrium towards more left-wing
policies in the initial period, which is costly to the elite. This again highlights that the underlying
problem leading to populist politics in this model is the weakness of democratic institutions and
the potential non-electoral power of the elite.
Our paper is related to a number of literatures. First, there is now a sizable literature
on signaling in elections. Formal models that incorporate ￿ the cost of betrayal￿and signaling
concerns into the platform choice by a politician seeking his ￿rst election date back to the
pioneering work of Banks (1990) and Harrington (1993). In both models, voters learn about
candidates￿behavior through repeated sampling. Callander and Wilkie (2007) consider signaling
equilibria in elections in which participating politicians have di⁄erent propensity to misinform
voters about their true preferences. Kartik and McAfee (2007) study a spatial model of elections
in which a candidate might be of the type committed to ful￿ll his campaign pledge. Thus, a
political position is a signal to the voters about the candidate￿ s ￿ honesty￿ . As a result, a candidate
who is perceived to be more likely to stick to his positition might win on an unpopular platform
over an opponent who caters to the median voter￿ s preferences.
Second, our paper is also related to several other works that use models in which politicians
or decision-makers have private information and are judged on the basis of performance or
messages that they send. Prendergast (1993) shows that workers have an incentive to conform
3to the opinions and expectations of their superiors. Morris (2001) studies ￿ political correctness￿
using a similar approach. Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001) and Maskin and Tirole
(2004) use similar ideas to show why leaders or elected o¢ cials may ￿ pander￿to the electorate.
None of these papers discuss or derive populist bias in politics. In addition, the framework we
present is more tractable than many of the models used in past work (because voters observe
noisy signals rather than choices), and as a result, it generates a unique equilibrium and a rich
set of comparative statics.
Third, our paper is also related to various models of political agency and the careers of
politicians. Austen-Smith and Banks (1989), Besley (2005, 2006) and Persson and Tabellini
(2000) present several di⁄erent approaches to political agency and the selection of politicians of
di⁄erent competences (see also Caselli and Morelli, 2004, Messner and Polborn, 2004, Mattozzi
and Merlo, 2007, and Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin, 2010). Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005)
model and estimate the careers of US congressmen.
Fourth, our work is related to the emerging literature on the elite capture of democratic
politics. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) and Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) emphasize
how a rich elite may be able to capture democratic politics and prevent redistributive policies.
Bates and La Ferrara (2001), Lizzeri and Persico (2005) and Padro-i-Miquel (2007), among
others, construct models in which certain forms of democratic competition may be detrimental
to the interests of the majority. Acemoglu, Robinson and Torvik (2010) analyze a model of
endogenous checks and balances. They show that in weakly-institutionalized democracies, voters
may voluntarily dismantle checks and balances on presidents as a way of increasing their rents
and making them more expensive to bribe for a better organized rich elite lobby. None of these
papers note or analyze the possibility of populist (left of the median) policies.
Finally, our paper is also related to a few papers investigating other aspects of populist
politics. Sachs (1989) discusses ￿ the populist cycle,￿where high inequality leads to policies that
make all groups worse o⁄ (because voters are shortsighted). Alesina (1989) emphasizes how
redistributive policies are captured by special interest groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a basic model with
politicians di⁄ering in their policy preferences. In Section 3 we analyze the equilibria of the
model and study the comparative statics. In Section 4, we supplement our analysis by studying
the case where some politicians can accept bribes. Section 5 concludes.
42 Model
There is a population consisting of two groups of citizens, a rich elite and a poor majority, and
a pool of politicians. Policy space is represented by R. There are two periods, t = 1;2, and in
each period there is a politician in power who chooses policy xt 2 R. Citizens only care about
policy outcomes. In particular, we assume that the utility of citizen i is given by
ui (x1;x2) = ur (x1;x2) = ￿
X2
t=1 (xt ￿ ￿r)
2 (1)
if the citizen is rich, and by
ui (x1;x2) = up (x1;x2) = ￿
X2
t=1 (xt ￿ ￿p)
2 (2)
if he is poor. These preferences imply that both types of citizens are averse to deviations from
their bliss policy. Without loss of generality, we set ￿p = 0, and ￿r = r > 0. We interpret
this as the poor preferring more ￿ left-wing￿policies, such as creating a more level playing ￿eld,
redistribution or investment in public goods favoring the poor, whereas the rich prefer lower
redistribution. Policies corresponding to x < 0 would be even more left-wing than the preferences
of the poor. The assumption that there is no discounting is adopted to save on notation.
Since there are only two groups of voters, and the poor form the majority, the median voter
is a poor agent, and ￿p = 0 corresponds to the political bliss point of the median voter. It is
straightforward to see that preferences here are single peaked, and all our results would apply if
there are more types of voters di⁄ering according to their political bliss points (again with the
convention that ￿p = 0 is the median).
The politicians care about policy, o¢ ce, and potentially bribes. Their utility is given by





2 + WIfin o¢ ce at tg + Bt
o
. (3)
Here, xt is the policy implemented at time t (by this or another politician), ￿ is the politician￿ s
ideal policy, and ￿ > 0 is the sensitivity to policy choice; W is the utility from being in o¢ ce, and
Bt is the bribe that he may receive at time t. We consider two possible alternative assumptions
about the politicians￿type. First, we rule bribes out, and assume that there are two types
of politician that di⁄er in their policy preferences. A fraction ￿ of politicians are ￿ moderates￿
and have a political bliss point identical to that of the median voter, which is a poor agent,
with political bliss point ￿ = 0.4 Motivated by the discussion of Latin American politics in the
4All of our results generalize to an environment where, instead of two groups, there is a distribution of
preferences, provided that the moderate politician is closer to the median voter than is the right-wing politician.
We chose the model with two groups to clearly emphasize that populist policies are not adopted to cater to the
preferences of some subgroup￿ in our model, they will always be to the left of the preferences of all voters.
5Introduction, where voters may be concerned about politicians choosing more right-wing policies
than they would like, we assume that the remaining fraction 1 ￿ ￿ are ￿ right-wingers￿and have
a political bliss point coinciding with that of the rich, ￿ = r. Voters do not directly observe the
type of the politician (so this type may be interpreted as the ￿ secret￿leaning of the politician).
The assumption that these political bliss points coincide with those of poor and rich voters again
serves to reduce notation. The important feature is that poor voters should prefer to have a
moderate in o¢ ce in the second period. In Section 4, we consider a slight variant, which may
be easier to map to the context of Latin American politics, where all politicians have the same
policy preferences, but di⁄er in their honesty. In particular, a fraction ￿ will be ￿ honest,￿while
the remaining fraction 1￿￿ will be ￿ dishonest,￿and thus can be bribed by the elite. The results
in these two variants are very similar.
At the end of the ￿rst period, there will be an election in which the median voter will
decide whether to reelect the politician or appoint a new politician from the pool of potential
politicians. In particular, we model this by assuming that at the end of the ￿rst period there
is a challenger of unknown type running against the challenger. Prior to the elections, voters
receive a noisy (common) signal s = x1 +z about the policy x1 chosen by the incumbent in the
￿rst period, where z is noise. Our interpretation for why voters observe a signal rather than the
actual policy is that the welfare implications of policies of the take time to be fully realized and
understood. All voters use this signal to update their priors about the politician￿ s type and vote
on the reelection of the incumbent politician. We assume that they do so in a forward-looking
(￿ rational￿ ) manner and vote to retain the incumbent only if their posterior that he is a moderate
type (or honest in the version in Section 4) is su¢ ciently high that they receive at least as high
utility retaining him as appointing a new politician.
We will look for a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game (in undominated
strategies), which ensures that the incumbent politician will be kept in power if the expected
utility of poor voters is greater when he remains in power than when a new politician is ap-
pointed.5
The exact timing of events is as follows:
1. The politician in power at time t = 1 chooses policy x1 2 R.
2. Voters obtain the signal s = x1 + z.
3. Elections take place, and each voter either supports the incumbent or the contender.6
5The requirement that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium should be in undominated strategies is for the usual
reason that in voting games, non-intuitive equilibria can be supported when voters use weakly dominated strate-
gies.
6For simplicity, we assume that whenever a voter is indi⁄erent, she supports the incumbent. In equilibrium
64. The politician in power at time t = 2 (the incumbent or newly elected politician) chooses
policy x2 2 R.
5. All agents learn the realizations of x1 and x2, and payo⁄s are realized (according to (1)￿
(3)).
We next impose the following two assumptions, which will be useful in establishing well-
de￿ned unique best responses.
Assumption 1 The noise variable z has a distribution with support on (￿1;+1) with c.d.f.
F (z) and p.d.f. f (z). The p.d.f. f (z) is symmetric around 0 and everywhere di⁄erentiable, and
satis￿es f0 (z) < 0 for all z > 0 (and thus f0 (z) > 0 for all z < 0).




as well as several other standard distributions satisfy this assumption.











Lemma 1 in the Appendix shows that this assumption implies that f (0) < 2
r. In other
words, values close to zero are not too likely, and there is a su¢ cient probability that there







ensures that there is su¢ cient uncertainty, which will guarantee that the relevant second-order
conditions hold and thus the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It is straightforward to
see that a normal distribution would satisfy this assumption if its variance is su¢ ciently large,




2￿e . One can also verify that until Section 4, it is su¢ cient to impose
(4) only for jzj < r.
3 Analysis





and therefore chooses his bliss point x2 = ￿ (which equals ￿p = 0 for a moderate politician and
￿r = r for a right-wing politician). This implies that the poor majority strictly prefers to have
this happens with zero probability.
7a moderate politician than a right-wing politician in power at date t = 2. Since the contender is
a moderate with probability ￿, the incumbent will win the elections only if the voters￿posterior
that he is moderate is no less than ￿.
Let us denote the equilibrium policy that a moderate politician chooses at time t = 1 by
x1 = a, and the policy that a right-wing politician chooses by x1 = b. It is intuitive that a < b,
and this result is formally established in Proposition 1. Clearly, the probability density of signal
s when policy x is chosen is given by f (s ￿ x). Given the prior ￿, Bayesian updating gives the
posterior that the incumbent is a moderate by
^ ￿ =
￿f (s ￿ a)
￿f (s ￿ a) + (1 ￿ ￿)f (s ￿ b)
. (5)
Inspection of (5) shows that the posterior ^ ￿ satis￿es ^ ￿ ￿ ￿ if and only if
f (s ￿ a) ￿ f (s ￿ b). (6)
Intuitively, the right-hand side of (5) depends on a and b only through the likelihood ratio
￿f(s￿a)
(1￿￿)f(s￿b), which must be at least
￿
1￿￿ (the corresponding ratio for the contender) if the incum-
bent is to be reelected; hence
f(s￿a)
f(s￿b) ￿ 1. By Assumption 1, f (￿) is symmetric and single-peaked,





The incumbent will be reelected if and only if condition (7) is satis￿ed. Therefore, the expected
probability of reelection for an incumbent as a function of his choice of policy x is
￿ (x) = Pr
￿












Note that this probability does not depend on the type of the incumbent, only on his choice
of policy (since his type is private and does not a⁄ect the realization of the signal beyond his
choice of policy).
We next establish that a < b and summarize the discussion about incumbent reelection.
Proposition 1 Denote the equilibrium policy of a moderate politician at t = 1 by x1 = a and
that of a right-wing politician by x1 = b. Then:
1. a < b, i.e., moderate politicians always choose a more left-wing policy than right-wing
politicians;
2. the incumbent politician is reelected if and only if s ￿ a+b
2 .
8Proof. See the Appendix.
Let us next investigate choices at date t = 1 more closely. A moderate incumbent solves the
following problem at date t = 1:
max
x2R
￿￿x2 + W￿ (x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿r2 (1 ￿ ￿ (x)). (9)
Here, ￿￿x2 is this politician￿ s ￿rst period utility, W is his second period utility if he is reelected
(since in this case he will choose x2 = 0, i.e., equal to his political bliss point), and ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿r2
is his expected second period utility if he is not reelected (with probability ￿ the contender is
a moderate and will choose x2 = 0, while with probability 1 ￿ ￿, a right-winger will come to
power and will choose x2 = r). The ￿rst-order condition for this problem is
￿2￿x ￿
￿












2 + W￿ (x) ￿ ￿￿r2 (1 ￿ ￿ (x)): (11)
The explanation for this expression is identical and relies on the fact that the right-wing in-
cumbent will incur utility cost ￿r2 only if he is not reelected and is replaced by a moderate
politician. The ￿rst-order condition for this problem is



































so the equilibrium can be characterized in terms of the intersection of two reaction curves:7
￿2￿a ￿
￿
















Mathematically, (10) depicts the equilibrium value of the policy of moderate politicians, a, when
right-wing politicians are choosing policy b. Conversely, (12) depicts the equilibrium value of
the policy of right-wingers when moderates are choosing a. Figure 1 plots these two curves in
the relevant region a ￿ b.
7Note, however, that these are not ￿ best response maps￿as we have already substituted for the equilibrium
conditions that (10) must hold at x = a and (12) at x = b.











Figure 1: Reaction curves of moderate (red/thick) and right-wing (green/thin) politicians. The
distribution f is taken to be normal and the parameter choices are W = ￿ = ￿ = 1
2 and
r = ￿ = 1.
Conditions (13) and (14) immediately imply that a < 0 and b < r, i.e., both types of
politicians in equilibrium choose policies which lie to the left of their political bliss points. For
moderate politician, this implies a populist policy choice￿ i.e., to the left of the median voter￿ s
political bliss point (we will also see that we might even have b < 0). This is for an intuitive
reason: for both types of politicians, a move to the left starting from their political bliss points
creates a second-order loss in the ￿rst period, but delivers a ￿rst-order increase in the probability
of reelection and thus a ￿rst-order expected gain.
The result that there will be a left bias in policies does not rely on positive bene￿ts from
holding o¢ ce (W > 0), though we will establish later that higher levels of W increase this bias.
This is because even when W = 0, each politician wants to be reelected because otherwise his
preferred policy will be implemented with probability less than one. This e⁄ect alone is su¢ cient
for a left bias in policy choice of both types.
Inspection of Figure 1 also provides a more detailed intuition for the results and be uniqueness
of equilibrium. The reaction curve of moderate politicians is upward-sloping, while the reaction
curve of right-wing politicians is downward-sloping. Formally, these statements follow from
di⁄erentiating (10) and (12) with respect to a and b. The key observation is that the median voter
will decide whether to reelect the incumbent politician depending on whether
f(s￿a)
f(s￿b) exceeds 1.
A politician may ensure that he is reelected with an arbitrarily large probability if he chooses
10an extreme left-wing policy, but this is clearly costly as the policy would be very far away from
his bliss point. The relevant trade-o⁄ for both types of politicians is therefore between choosing
a policy close to their bliss point on the one hand and deviating from their bliss point and
increasing their reelection probability on the other. But how much this deviation will increase
their reelection probability depends on the expectations of the median voter concerning what
types of policies both types of politicians will adopt. Formally, the question is whether a small
change in policy will increase
f(s￿a)
f(s￿b) from below 1 to above 1 (which thus requires that
f(s￿a)
f(s￿b) is
in some "-neighborhood of 1). Suppose, for example, that right-wing politicians are expected to
choose a more left-wing policy than before. This would make the policies of the two types closer,
and it becomes harder for voters to distinguish one type of politicians from another (equivalently,
f(s￿a)
f(s￿b) is more likely to be in any given "-neighborhood of 1). In response, it would be optimal for
moderate politicians to choose an even more left-wing policy in order to distinguish themselves
and get reelected with a high probability. This is the reason why (13) is upward-sloping.
Why is (14) downward-sloping? Consider the situation in which moderate politicians are
expected to choose more left-wing policies. One might, at ￿rst, expect that the same reasoning
should push right-wing politicians to also choose more left-wing policies. But since a < b, a
further shift to the left by moderate politicians will make it more likely that the median voter
will be able to distinguish moderate than right-wing politicians (or more formally,
f(s￿a)
f(s￿b) is now
less likely to be in any given "-neighborhood of 1, and thus a small shift to the left by right-wing
politicians is less likely to win them the election). This reduces the potential gains from choosing
further left-wing policies for right-wing politicians and encourages them to choose policies more
in line with their own preferences.
The above discussion ensures the uniqueness of equilibrium. Then characterizing this equi-
librium is straightforward. Let us combine (13) and (14) to obtain
b = a
W + ￿￿r2
W + (1 ￿ ￿)￿r2 + r.
Therefore, the equilibrium level of populist bias (of moderate politicians), p = jaj = ￿a, is
2￿p =
￿





￿r2 1 ￿ 2￿





Proposition 2 There exists a unique (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium (in pure strategies). In
this equilibrium, politicians choose their preferred policy in the second period. In the ￿rst period,
politicians choose policies which lie to the left of their preferred policy. In particular, moderate
politicians necessarily choose a ￿ populist￿policy to the left of the political bliss point of the median
voter.
11Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 thus shows that a unique equilibrium always exists (given our assumptions),
and that this equilibrium will always feature leftist bias by both types of politicians, and populist
policies (to the left of the median voter) by moderate politicians. The intuition for this result
was already provided above.
We next provide several comparative static results.
Proposition 3 The populist bias of moderate politicians, p = jaj, is higher when:
1. W is higher (i.e., politicians value being in o¢ ce more);
2. ￿ is lower (i.e., poor politicians are rarer);
3. ￿ is lower, provided that W 6= 0 (i.e., changing political positions is relatively costless for
politicians).
Proof. See the Appendix.
These comparative static results are fairly intuitive. A higher utility from remaining in o¢ ce
increases the incentives for reelection and thus encourages greater signaling by choosing more
left-wing policies. Consequently, moderate politicians and up choosing more populist policies.
The comparative static result with respect to ￿ has a similar intuition: when ￿ is lower, this
utility from choosing a policy di⁄erent from their bliss point is less important relative to the gain
of utility from remaining in o¢ ce, and this encourages more signaling and thus more left-wing
policies by both politicians.
The comparative statics with respect to ￿￿ the share of politicians that are moderate￿ is a
little more subtle. When ￿ is lower, the probability that a new politician, if the incumbent is
not reelected, will be moderate is lower. This makes it more costly for moderate politicians not
to be reelected and induces them to choose more left policies. There is a countervailing e⁄ect,
however, because the same calculus implies that right-wing politicians have less to fear from
not being reelected, which makes them choose less left policies; because the reaction curve of
modern politicians is upward-sloping, this e⁄ect induces them to choose less left biased policies.
Nevertheless, when the density f is not high enough (in particular when it satis￿es Assumption
2), the latter e⁄ect is dominated by the former, and the populist bias of moderate politicians
increases.
Our next result shows that under an additional assumption on the form of the noise, an
increase in polarization (corresponding to a bigger gap between the bliss points of moderate and
right-wing politicians) also increases populist bias. To simplify the statement of the result, we
12will impose that the distribution of the noise z is normal. The proof of the proposition shows
that this assumption can be replaced by a stronger version of Assumption 2.
Proposition 4 Suppose that noise F is normally distributed. Then:
1. If W = 0 and r < 2￿, then an increase in polarization increases the populist bias of
moderate politicians.
2. As W increases, the e⁄ect of polarization on the populist bias diminishes.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition shows that, under the additional assumptions we have imposed, populist
policies are also more likely when there is greater ￿ polarization￿in society, meaning a bigger gap
between the political bliss points of the median voter and the moderate politician on the one
hand and that of the right-wing politician on the other. There is a simple intuition underlying
this result: with greater polarization, the bene￿t from reelection to both types of politicians is
greater, encouraging more populist policies in the ￿rst period. However, the result is not ambigu-
ous (hence the need for imposing the additional conditions) because there is also a countervailing
e⁄ect: greater polarization also makes it more costly for right-wing politicians to choose populist
policies. Our additional assumptions ensure that this second e⁄ect is dominated.
Our ￿nal result in this section investigates whether right-wing politicians will also choose
populist policies (to the left of the median voter).
Proposition 5 1. In the absense of direct bene￿ts from holding o¢ ce (i.e., if W = 0), right-
wing politicians never choose choose policies to the left of median voter￿ s political bliss
point (i.e., we have b > 0 > a).
2. b is decreasing in W.
3. If W > 0, the equilibrium may involve a < b < 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When there are no direct bene￿ts or rents from holding o¢ ce (i.e., W = 0), then right-wing
politicians will never bias their policies so much to the left as to end up to the left of the median.
This is because the cost of not getting reelected is to see the political bliss point of a moderate
politician, which is the same as the median voter￿ s bliss point, implemented.8 However, higher
8This result continues to hold, a fortiori, if the future is discounted. But if the second period is more important
in politicians￿uility than the ￿rst period, then there may be populist bias in right-wing politicians￿choices even
with W = 0.
13bene￿ts from holding o¢ ce increase the left bias of not only moderate politicians, but also of
right-wing politicians. Consequently, for su¢ ciently high values of W, remaining in o¢ ce is so
valuable for right-wing politicians that they may also end up choosing populist policies.
4 Corruption
We have so far assumed that politicians have policy preferences that are private information
and some politicians may (secretly) have right-wing preferences. Politicians then choose policies
to signal to the voters that they do not have such right-wing preferences. An equally (or
more) plausible reason why politicians may wish to signal to voters is to convince them that
they are not unduly in￿ uenced, or captured, by the rich elite. This is particularly relevant
in weak democracies, such as many in Latin America, where the rich elite have several non-
electoral means of in￿ uencing politics (including lobbying or direct bribery) and may have a
disproportionate impact on policies. In this section, we investigate the implications of voters￿
concern that politicians may be unduly in￿ uenced by the rich elite.
To focus on the main issue at hand, we now assume that politicians are identical in terms of
their policy preferences (and without sacri￿cing qualitative conclusions, these coincide with the
preferences of the majority of the electorate), but instead, a fraction ￿ of politicians are ￿ honest￿
in the sense that they cannot or will not cannot accept bribes, while the remaining 1 ￿ ￿ share
are ￿ dishonest￿and thus corruptible. The bribing process is potentially imperfect (ine¢ cient),
and we capture this by assuming that whenever there is such a transaction, the parties must
incur cost C ￿ 0 to avoid being detected. This introduces a parameter that will be useful for
comparative statics (and we could set C = 0). After the cost C is subtracted, the remainder of
the surplus is split between the rich elite and the politician in power, and the politician receives
a share ￿ (on the remaining surplus, i.e., the surplus minus the cost C).
The timing of the new game is therefore as follows.
1. The politician in power at time t = 1 and the elite bargain over x1 (if the politician is
dishonest), and the politician chooses policy x1 2 R.
2. Voters obtain the signal s = x1 + z.
3. Voters vote, and decide whether to replace the current incumbent with a random one
drawn from the pool of potential politicians.
4. The politician in power at time t = 2 (the incumbent or newly elected politician) and the
elite bargain over x2, and the politician chooses policy x2 2 R.
145. All agents learn the realizations of x1 and x2, and payo⁄s are realized according to (1)-(3)
(with Bt given by the share ￿ of the surplus minus C).
This timing of the sizes that the structure of the game is very similar to that in Section
2, except for the bargaining between the politician and the elite in stages 1 and 4. Note that
parameter ￿ which has so far captured the intensity of politicians￿policy preferences may now
be given di⁄erent/complementary interpretations. First, a small ￿ may also correspond to
(or result from) a large size of the elite, bene￿ting from right-wing policies, making bribing
can be relatively inexpensive for the elite. Conversely, a large ￿ could be interpreted as the
elite constituting a relatively small group of the population. Second, a large ￿ can also be
interpreted as the politician standing in for a large bureaucracy, thus increasing the monetary
and transactional costs of bribing.
As before, we start our analysis with the second period. Then, an honest politician will
choose his bliss point xh
2 = 0. A corrupt politician, on the other hand, will bargain with the
elite, and the equilibrium policy is determined from the joint maximization of the sum of their



















Naturally, a higher ￿, which corresponds either to a greater weight on politician￿ s preferences or
smaller elite that will bene￿t from biasing the policy, implies a policy closer to the politician￿ s
political bliss point. As a consequence, the second period joint utility of a dishonest politician





and the gain in utility, as compared to the status-quo W ￿ r2 (since without the bribe, the
politician would choose xc
2 = 0), is r2






In this case, we can simply determine the level of the bribe B2 from the equation
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15Interestingly, the e⁄ect of the intensity of politician￿ s preferences on the bribe is nonmonotonic:
the bribe reaches its maximum at ￿ =
1￿￿
1+￿; for lower ￿, the bribe is smaller because the politician
is very cheap to persuade, and for very large ￿, the politician is too hard to bribe, hence in the
limit the bribe disappears.
The following proposition characterizes several useful features of the equilibrium.
Proposition 6 Suppose that C is such that (17) holds. Then:
1. In the second period, honest politicians choose xh




2. In the ￿rst period, honest and corrupt politicians choose policies xh
1 = a and xc
1 = b such
that a < b;
3. The median voter prefers to have an honest politician in the second period, and reelects





Proof. See the Appendix.
Part 1 of Proposition 6 was established earlier, while Parts 2 and 3 are similar to the results
established in Proposition 1 in the case without bribery.
Let us next turn to the ￿rst-period problem. If the second period involves no bribing, then
in the ￿rst period, politicians have no reelection concerns￿ recall that when indi⁄erent voters
reelect the incumbent. As a consequence, politicians will solve an identical problem in the second
period, and thus the solution is the same and involves no corruption. The interesting case where
dishonest politicians accept bribes in the second period (which is the case when (17) holds) is
the one studied in Proposition 6. In this case, the probability of reelection of a politician who









(1 ￿ ￿ (x)). (18)
Note that this problem is the same as (9), except that when the honest incumbent is replaced by





instead of ￿￿r2 (since the second period policy
in this case will be given by (16)).
This maximization problem gives the ￿rst-order condition
￿2￿x ￿
 












16A dishonest politician bargains with the elite both in the ￿rst and second periods. In the ￿rst






























The ￿rst two terms relate to the ￿rst period￿ s utilities of the incumbent and the elite, respectively.
If this (dishonest) politician is reelected, then together with the elite he jointly obtains second-
period utility W ￿ ￿r2
￿+1 ￿ C. If he is not reelected but another dishonest politician comes to
power, their joint utility is ￿ ￿r2
￿+1 ￿ B2 (the same policy is implemented and the elite has to
pay the same second-period bribe, but the current incumbent receives neither the direct bene￿ts
from holding o¢ ce nor the bribes). Finally, if an honest politician is elected, the incumbent and
the elite together obtain ￿r2.
The ￿rst-order condition of their maximization problem gives:
￿2￿x ￿ 2(x ￿ r)￿
￿
W ￿ C +













Since ￿rst-order conditions (19) and (21) must be satis￿ed in equilibrium for x = a and















￿2￿b ￿ 2(b ￿ r) ￿
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W ￿ C +































Plugging this into (22) and denoting, as before, the populist bias (of honest politicians) by


























The next proposition follows from our analysis so far and from this expression.
Proposition 7 Suppose (17) holds (so there is corruption in the second period when the politi-
cian is dishonest). Then:
171. There exists a unique equilibrium (in pure strategies). In this equilibrium, honest politicians
choose populist policies in the ￿rst period (i.e., a < 0). Dishonest politicians accept a bribe.
2. When W = ￿ = 0, dishonest politicians will not choose populist, i.e., b > 0. When either
W > 0 and/or ￿ > 0, dishonest politicians may choose populist policies, i.e., b < 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for why honest politicians now choose populist policies is similar to before: a
small move to the left starting from their political bliss point has a second-order cost in terms
of ￿rst-period utility, and a ￿rst-order gain in terms of the probability of reelection and second-
period utility. The last part of the result suggests that if dishonest politicians do not value being
in power per se (obtaining neither direct bene￿ts from being in o¢ ce nor positive rights), then
the equilibrium will never involve populist policies in the ￿rst period. This is because reelection
has limited bene￿ts for dishonest politicians and this makes populist policies jointly too costly
for the elite and the politician. The converse case is more interesting. In this case, even though
dishonest politicians are e⁄ectively representing the wishes of the elite (because of bribery),
they will still choose populist policies so as to increase their likelihood of coming to power and
obtaining higher utility (for themselves and for the elite) in the second period.
The comparative static results of populist bias are again intuitive, but they also help us to
further clarify the nature of the results in this case.
Proposition 8 Suppose that (17) holds. Then, the populist bias of honest politicians, p = jaj,
is higher when:
1. W is higher (greater direct utility from holding o¢ ce);
2. C is lower (greater gains from the election for this honest politicians because bribing is
more e¢ cient);
3. ￿ is higher (dishonest politicians have higher bargaining power vis-￿-vis the elite);
4. ￿ is lower (honest politicians are relatively rare).
Proof. See the Appendix.
A higher W makes both politicians value reelection more; they thus engage in more signaling
(by choosing more populist policies). A lower C increases the joint utility of the elite and
the incumbent in case of reelection, and this makes dishonest politicians choose more left-wing
policies, which in turn enables honest politicians to do the same. A higher ￿ makes holding o¢ ce
18more valuable for dishonest politicians. This again makes them seek o¢ ce more aggressively by
choosing policies that are more left-wing, and honest politicians respond by also changing their
policies to the left. Since they were already to the left of the median voter, this increases the
populist bias of honest politicians. Finally, if honest politicians are rare, it makes them even
more willing to signal because the population￿ s prior is that dishonest politicians are the norm
not the exception.
Our discussion so far suggests that the potential corruption of politicians empowers the elite
to secure policies that are more favorable to their interest. However, as we emphasized in the
Introduction, there is a countervailing e⁄ect: the fact that the elite will be able to in￿ uence
politics leads to equilibrium signaling by choosing more left-wing policies. In fact, we have seen
that this always makes honest politicians choose populist policies to the left of the preferences
of the median voter. This raises the possibility that the elite￿ s ability to bribe politicians may
actually harm them (by creating a strong left-wing bias in the ￿rst period). The next proposition
shows that when W is su¢ ciently large, the elite may be worse o⁄ when they are able to bribe
than hypothetical world in which they are never able to in￿ uence politics via bribes.
Proposition 9 There exists ￿ W such that if W > ￿ W, the elite are better o⁄ when (17) does not
hold as compared to the case in which it holds (or in the extreme, where C = 0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, when politicians receive su¢ cient rents from holding o¢ ce, policy choices by both
honest and dishonest politicians will be more to the left, and as a result, despite their ability
to bribe dishonest politicians, the elite will end up with ￿rst-period policies that are very far
from there preferences. In this case, they may have lower utility than a situation without the
possibility of bribery (which would have led to the implementation of the median voter￿ s bliss
point in both periods). This result thus shows that weak institutions, which normally empower
the elite, may at the end make them worse o⁄because of the endogenous response of democratic
policies, even if democracy works only imperfectly.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a simple theory of populist politics. Populist politics is interpreted
as (some) politicians adopting populist policies that are harmful to the rich elite but are not
in the best interest of the poor majority or the median voter. More speci￿cally, such policies,
which may at least on the surface involve defending the rights of the poor against the elite,
establishing redistributive programs and leveling the playing ￿eld, are to the left of the bliss
19point of the median voter, but still receive support from the median because they signal that
the politician does not have a secret right-wing agenda and is not unduly in￿ uenced by the rich
elite. The driving force of populist politics is the weakness of democratic institutions, which
makes voters believe that politicians, despite their rhetoric, might have a right-wing agenda or
may be corruptible or unduly in￿ uenced by the elite. Populist policies thus emerge as a way for
politicians to signal that they will choose future policies in line with the interests of the median
voter.
We show that moderate politicians will necessarily choose policies to the left of the median
voter￿ s preferences, and even right-wing politicians (or those that are captured and bribed by
the elite) may end up choosing policies to the left of the median voter. This leftist (populist)
bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in o¢ ce is higher for the politician; when
there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right-wing
politicians; and when politicians are indeed likely to have a hidden right-wing agenda.
When (some) politicians can be bribed, we also ￿nd that the e¢ ciency of the process of
bribery and the share of the surplus that politicians can capture also encourage left- wing bias
(because they make politicians more eager to get reelected). Interestingly, in this case, the elite
may be worse o⁄ than a situation in which institutions are stronger and bribery is not possible
(because the equilibrium left-wing bias of ￿rst-period policies is more pronounced).
Our paper and model have been motivated by Latin American politics, where populist poli-
cies and rhetoric as well as fears of politicians reneging on their redistributive agenda and being
excessively in￿ uenced by rich and powerful elites right have been commonplace. Nevertheless,
the ideas here can be applied to other contexts. If voters are afraid of a secret left-wing agenda,
then the equilibrium will create a force towards right-wing policies. Similarly, if bureaucrats
are expected to show a bias in favor of a particular group or a particular type of policy, their
actions may be biased in the opposite direction to dispel these notions and guarantee good
performance evaluation. One could also study variants in which both types of extremism are
possible. Finally, our model has focused on a two-period economy to communicate the basic
ideas in the clearest fashion. In a multi-period setup, politicians may choose biased policies for
several periods. Despite the tractability of our basic model, the in￿nite-horizon extension turns
out to be challenging and is an open area for future research.
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23Appendix: Proofs
The following Lemma is useful to understand the role and consequences of Assumption 2.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then:









Proof of Lemma 1. Part 1. Assumption 2 implies that jf0 (x)j < 2
r2 if jxj < r. Hence,
whenever jxj < r, we have jf (x) ￿ f (0)j ￿ 4
r2 jxj. This implies f (x) ￿ f (0) ￿ 4


































This immediately implies rf (0) < 2, and thus f (0) < 3
2r < 2
r.





























Proof of Proposition 1.
Part 1. Consider three cases: a < b, a > b, and a = b. Median voter￿ s posterior that the
politician is poor is (by Bayes rule)
^ ￿ =
￿f (s ￿ a)
￿f (s ￿ a) + (1 ￿ ￿)f (s ￿ b)
.
If a = b, then ^ ￿ = ￿, and thus, by assumption, the incumbent is necessarily reelected. The poor
and rich incumbents then choose their bliss points, so a = 0 < r = b, which contradicts a = b.
If a 6= b, then ^ ￿ ￿ ￿ if and only if
f (s ￿ a) ￿ f (s ￿ b),
which simpli￿es to s ￿ (a + b)=2 if a < b and to s ￿ (a + b)=2 if a > b. But if a > b, the
likelihood of reelection is given by
￿ (x) = Pr(x + z ￿ (a + b)=2) = 1 ￿ F ((a + b)=2 ￿ x) = F (x ￿ (a + b)=2)
24(the last equality follows from the symmetry of distribution). Hence, poor and rich incumbents
solve problems
max
x ￿￿x2 + W￿ (x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿r2 (1 ￿ ￿ (x)),
max
x ￿￿(x ￿ r)















































Adding these inequalities, dividing by ￿ and simplifying, we get
￿a2 ￿ (b ￿ r)















































However, in that case Assumption 2 is violated.
Part 2. By part 1, the only remaining possibility is a < b. The statement for this case is
proved in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2. The second derivatives for (9) and (11) are
￿2￿ +
￿



















respectively. Assumption 2 ensures that both are satis￿ed. Once this is true, we ￿nd that (13)
implies an increasing a as a function of b whenever a < b, whereas (14) implies a decreasing b as
25a function of a whenever a < b. Consequently, if an equilibrium exists, it is unique, since these
￿best-response￿curves may intersect only once. The existence result trivially follows from (15):
clearly, the left-hand side and the right-hand side have an intersection at some positive p.
Proof of Proposition 3. Part 1. Let us rewrite (15) as









￿r2 1 ￿ 2￿









￿r2 1 ￿ 2￿




(y > 0 because it equals b￿a
2 , which is positive by Proposition 2). Notice that, since f (x) < 2
r
for any x, then
p <
￿
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W + (1 ￿ ￿)￿r2￿ 1
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In addition, (A1) implies
p =
W + (1 ￿ ￿)￿r2
2￿
f (y). (A3)
We now di⁄erentiate G with respect to p and W. We have
@G
@p
= ￿r21 ￿ 2￿
2











￿ 2￿ < 0.
Di⁄erentiating by W yields
@G
@W
= f (y) ￿
p
2
￿r2 1 ￿ 2￿
(W + (1 ￿ ￿)￿r2)















> f (y) ￿
1
2
f (y) > 0;







and thus p is increasing in W.
Part 2. Let us di⁄erentiate G with respect to ￿. We have
@G
@￿
= ￿￿r2f (y) ￿
p
2
￿r2 ￿r2 + 2W
W + (1 ￿ ￿)￿r2f0 (y)
< ￿￿r2f (y) +
p
2
￿r2 ￿r2 + 2W





























and hence p is decreasing in ￿.










r2 1 ￿ 2￿
W




￿ 2p = 0. (A4)
Consequently, if W = 0, then equilibrium populist bias p does not depend on ￿. If W > 0,
then, since (A4) only depends on W and ￿ through W
￿ , an increase in ￿ has the same e⁄ect as
a decrease in W. In other words, p is decreasing in ￿. This completes the proof.














￿ reaches its maximum at x = ￿￿, and this maximum equals
1 p







which is obviously satis￿ed if W = 0 and r < 2￿.
Now, di⁄erentiate G with respect to r. We have
@G
@r
= 2(1 ￿ ￿)￿rf (y) +
W2 + 2￿r(p + r ￿ 2p￿ ￿ r￿)W + ￿2r4 (1 ￿ ￿)
2
2(W + (1 ￿ ￿)￿r2)
f0 (y).
27If W = 0, we have
@G
@r
= 2(1 ￿ ￿)￿rf (y) +





































(it is worth noting that for this result, we would not need the assumption about normal distri-
bution).
Part 2. As W varies, so does p, and in such a way that
p
W+(1￿￿)￿r2 remains constant (this
follows from (A1)). Consequently, as W increases, y remains constant. This implies, ￿rst, that
@G
@p remains constant, and the full derivative of @G
















Now, since f0 (y) < 0, then to show that @G
@r is decreasing in W it su¢ ces to show that y > r
4.
To do that, we prove that solution to equation






which we obtain from (A1), satis￿es y > r























r = z, r
￿ = k; then this equation may be rewritten as g (z) = 1
2, where

















28Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that z < 1
4. Then on the interval 0 < k <
4 p
8￿e (which
captures all values of k = r
￿ that satisfy (A5), function ke￿ 1
2k2z2
is monotonically increasing,
and thus does not exceed its value at k =
4 p
8￿e. Therefore,
































This leads us to a contradiction, meaning that for no z < 1
4 it is possible that g (z) = 1
2. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. Part 1. If W = 0, an elite politician would never choose x1 <
0. Indeed, in this case he would get at most ￿(r ￿ x1)
2 < ￿r2, even if his ideal policy is
implemented in the second period. At the same time, he can always guarantee getting ￿r2 by
choosing x1 = r (in that case, x2 will be either 0 or r, depending on the election result and new
politician￿ s type). Consequently, x1 = r would be a pro￿table deviation, and thus x1 < 0 may
not be the case in an equilibrium if W = 0.
Part 2. Combining (13) and (14) yields
a = (b ￿ r)
W + (1 ￿ ￿)￿r2
W + ￿￿r2 ;







￿r2 1 ￿ 2￿




￿ 2￿(r ￿ b) = 0.
The remainder of the proof is completely analogous with the proof of Part 1 of Proposition 3:
like there, we show that r ￿ b is increasing in W, and thus b is decreasing in W.










W + (1 ￿ ￿)￿r2 + r.
If W is su¢ ciently large, equilibrium populism p can be made arbitrarily large (otherwise in
(15), the argument of f would be bounded from below, and thus the right-hand side could be
arbitrarily large, which is incompatible with the left-hand side being bounded). But then x
p
1 may
be arbitrarily large (in absolute value) negative number, and thus xr
1 will also become negative,
since
W+￿￿r2
W+(1￿￿)￿r2 has a limit as W ! 1. This completes the proof.
29Proof of Proposition 6.
The proof of the Proposition is completely analagous to the proof of Proposition 1 and is
omitted.
Proof of Proposition 7. Part 1. Notice that under Assumption 2, problems (18) and (20)
are convex. Indeed, take (18); the second derivative w.r.t. x equals
￿2￿ +
 

















< W +(1 ￿ ￿)￿r2. For problem (20), the second








































































< W + ￿r2,
and thus (A6) is negative, provided that 2 is satis￿ed. As in the Proposition 2 we get that
equilibrium is determined by the intersection of a as an increasing function of b and of b as a
decreasing function of a. This ensures that equilibrium is unique if it exists, and existence is
proved similarly to Proposition 2. Finally, as the ￿rst-period policy of an honest politician is
given by (19), we immediately obtain a < 0.
Part 2. It is straightforward to see that if there is corruption in the second period, then
there is one in the ￿rst (without bribes, dishonest politicians would choose b < 0, which gives
the elite even more incentives to bribe them. Given that, we can apply the reasoning we used
in the proof of Proposition 5. If W = ￿ = 0, then the dishonest incumbent has not reelection
motives except for in￿ uence the policy choice. Consequently, the incumbent and the elite will
jointly choose policy x1 > 0, for otherwise they would be better o⁄ choosing any policy between
0 and 1 in the ￿rst period, and then playing equilibrium strategies in the second. If, however,
W is high enough, we can again show that neither a nor b are bounded from below, and thus
b < 0 is possible.
30Proof of Proposition 8. Part 1. Let us rewrite (24) as











































(y > 0 because it equals b￿a

























































￿ ￿ ￿ 2￿ < 0
(since f0 (y) < 0, @H




= f (y) +








> f (y) ￿



















31and thus p is increasing in W.








so p is decreasing in C.














and thus p is increasing in ￿.












W (1 + ￿)
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and thus p is decreasing in ￿. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 9. If W is high enough, then for C = 0, both a and b can be arbitrarily
low in the ￿rst period if. In that case, the utility of the elite may be arbitrarily low, whereas
for C su¢ ciently high, there is no corruption, and the utility of the elite is given by ￿2r2, as
all politicians will choose x1 = x2 = 0. Consequently, there exists ￿ W such that for W > ￿ W, the
elite is better o⁄ under C = 0. This completes the proof.
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